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Abstract
How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be ag-
gregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there
are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of
propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities
and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom stud-
ied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to lling this
gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of
propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. Our
rst theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation
rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation,
including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our sec-
ond theorem abstracts even further from the specic kinds of attitudes
in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggrega-
tion rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach
integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation.
1 Introduction
On the Humean picture of rational agency, an agent is a system that has
beliefs and desires about the world and acts in pursuit of its desires in ac-
cordance with its beliefs.1 Beliefs and desires can be modelled as attitudes
1Our account of agency as well as our broad picture of the nature of propositional
attitudes follows List and Pettit (forthcoming). See also Dennett (1987) and Pettit (1993).
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that the agent holds towards certain propositions. In the simplest case, an
agent believes a proposition if it represents the world as being such that the
proposition is true; an agent desires a proposition if it would like the world
to be such that the proposition is true. Many di¤erent theoretical models
of propositional attitudes have been developed. In the standard theory of
rational choice in economics, for example, beliefs are represented as proba-
bilities, desires as utilities.2 Alternatively, to give just one other example,
beliefs can be represented as binary (acceptance/rejection) judgments, and
desires as binary (acceptance/rejection) goals or preferences.
In many contexts, individual human beings are not the only agents hold-
ing propositional attitudes. Many collectives also need to form such atti-
tudes, for instance when they are faced with certain joint decisions, or when
they are required to speak with a single voice.3 Legislatures, collegial courts,
juries, multi-member governments, executive boards of companies, expert
panels and groups of scientic collaborators are just a few examples of col-
lectives that are commonly required to form propositional attitudes. They
have to form beliefs on various facts about the world, as well as preferences
on what actions to take. Even groups as large and diverse as the entire
demoswithin a democracy are sometimes said to hold beliefs and desires.
How can a group come to hold such attitudes? More specically, how
can the propositional attitudes of multiple individuals be combined into a
single set of collective such attitudes? The aim of this paper is to investi-
gate this problem of attitude aggregation. Notably, the need to aggregate
propositional attitudes arises not only in the interpersonal contexts of group
decision-making and collective agency just mentioned. It also arises in sev-
eral intrapersonal contexts. When a single agent decides what opinion to
2Probability and utility functions are typically cardinal, but preferences, which are also
commonly invoked in economics, are often represented ordinally.
3The most famous variant of this problem is Arrows (1951/1963) problem of social
choice, in which the preferences of multiple individuals are to be aggregated into an overall
collective preference. The study of preference aggregation in Arrows tradition has recently
been complemented by the study of judgment aggregation (e.g., List and Pettit 2002,
Dietrich 2007a and references below). Both problems can be traced back to Condorcet
(1785). An account of group agency is developed in List and Pettit (forthcoming).
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form in light of the opinions of several others, he or she is e¤ectively faced
with a problem of attitude aggregation.4 Furthermore, individual agents
are sometimes conceptualized as composite systems whose overall attitudes
result from the aggregation of the attitudes of its component selves; this
parallel between intrapersonal and interpersonal attitude aggregation is also
implicit in Platos famous analogy between the city and the soul.5 Finally,
an individual agent revising his or her beliefs in the light of new evidence
can also be seen as merging his or her original attitudes with the attitudes
warranted by the new evidence.6 Thus attitude aggregation problems arise
in contexts of social choice, individual deliberation based on the testimony
of others, multiple selves, and belief revision.
While the aggregation of many particular kinds of propositional atti-
tudes has already been investigated in great detail, the problem of attitude
aggregation is seldom addressed in full generality. There are large litera-
tures on the aggregation of preferences, the aggregation of judgments, the
aggregation of probabilities, and the aggregation of utilities,7 but these and
other elds of aggregation theory are surprisingly disconnected from each
other, and we still lack a unied theoretical framework that subsumes them
all. Moreover, there are some kinds of propositional attitudes  for in-
stance, ranking functions over propositions8 whose aggregation has never
been studied. We are certainly unable to provide a fully general theory of
propositional attitude aggregation in this paper, but we hope to sketch some
ingredients of such a theory.
This paper has three main sections. In section 2, we informally introduce
4E.g., Lehrer and Wagner (1981), Pettit (2006), List (2008). We will now refer to an
individual agent as he or she rather than it.
5E.g., Elster (1987), Minsky (1988), Pettit (2003), Plato (360 BC).
6E.g., van Benthem (2008).
7The literature on preference aggregation follows Arrow (1951/1963). On judgment ag-
gregation, see, e.g., List and Pettit (2002), Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2007a),
Dietrich and List (2007a), Nehring and Puppe (2008) and surveys in List and Puppe
(2009), List (2009). On probability aggregation, see, e.g., Lehrer and Wagner (1981), Mc-
Conway (1981), Genest and Zidek (1986), Mongin (1995), Dietrich and List (2007b), Diet-
rich (2008). On utility aggregation, see, e.g., Sen (1982), dAspremont and Gevers (2002).
8For an overview, see Spohn (forthcoming).
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the problem of attitude aggregation and explain its generality. In section
3, we present a new theorem which simultaneously characterizes a class of
aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference ag-
gregation. And in section 4, we formulate the ingredients of the problem of
attitude aggregation more generally, describing how we can model proposi-
tional attitudes in a way that abstracts from the specic kinds of attitudes
in question and presenting a more general theorem. The paper ends with
some brief concluding remarks.
2 The problem
As noted in the introduction, propositional attitudes are key concepts in
any theory of rational agency. On the standard Humean picture of rational
agency, an agent is characterized by having both beliefs and desires, which
play certain roles in determining the agents actions. On some alternative,
less established pictures, an agents attitudes fall into only one category
whose functional role in determining action subsumes that of both beliefs
and desires on the Humean picture.9 There are a variety of theories of
rational agency, which di¤er in the kinds of propositional attitudes they
ascribe to agents and in their account of the nature of those attitudes.
We can characterize di¤erent kinds of propositional attitudes along at
least two dimensions:10 rst, the role they play within the agents rational
performance, e.g., whether they are belief-like or desire-like; and second,
their formal structure, e.g., whether they are binary or admit of degrees.
Propositions can also be represented in more than one way. On a syntactic
approach, they are represented by sentences in a suitable language; on a
semantic one, by sets of possible worlds. But since there exists a partial iso-
morphism between these two approaches, we here set this distinction aside,
focusing instead on the variation in the role and structure of propositional
attitudes.
9For a discussion of some anti-Humean alternatives, see Lewis (1988, 1996), Bradley
and List (forthcoming).
10 In presenting this taxonomy, we follow closely the account of propositional attitudes
developed in List and Pettit (forthcoming).
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An agents attitude towards a proposition plays the role of a belief if it
is part of the agents cognitive representation of what the world is like; it
plays the role of a desire if it is part of the agents motivational state as
to what the agent would want the world to be like. A belief-like attitude
towards a proposition captures the degree to which the agent cognitively
represents that proposition as being true or false; a desire-like attitude to-
wards a proposition captures the degree to which the agent is emotively
disposed in favour of or against its truth.11
An agents attitude towards a proposition is structurally binary if the
attitude is either positive or negative, i.e., the agent either takes an a¢ rma-
tive stance towards the proposition or a non-a¢ rmative one. In the recent
literature on judgment aggregation, binary belief-like attitudes are called
judgments.12 According to this terminology, an agent either does or does
not judge a given proposition to be true. There is no such thing as judging
to a greater or lesser extent that the proposition is true. Similarly, binary
desire-like attitudes can be described as goals or, in a non-standard use of
language, categorical preferences not to be confused with (ordinal) pref-
erences, as discussed below. On this picture, an agent either does or does
not prefer a particular proposition to be true; the truth of that proposition
either is or is not a goal for the agent.
On the other hand, an agents attitude towards a proposition is non-
binary if it admits of degrees, i.e., it can take a number of values, pos-
sibly in between the extremes of full a¢ rmation and full non-a¢ rmation
(and maybe there is not even a theoretical maximum or minimum to the
strength of attitude). Non-binary propositional attitudes can take several
forms. In the standard theory of rational choice, as mentioned above, non-
binary beliefs are typically represented by subjective probability functions,
and non-binary desires by utility functions. Generally, non-binary proposi-
tional attitudes can be represented by suitable real-valued functions whose
properties capture the precise formal structure of the attitudes. If the func-
11As has become common, we distinguish between belief-like and desire-like attitudes
in terms of the di¤erent directions of tbetween the attitudes and the world.
12This terminology was introduced in List and Pettit (2002).
5
tions representing the attitudes are unique only up to positive monotonic
transformations  i.e., stretchingand squeezing then we say that the
attitudes are ordinal ; below we introduce an alternative relation-theoretic
representation of ordinal attitudes. By contrast, if the numerical values of
these functions have some signicance over and above the ordering they
induce over the propositions, then we say that the attitudes are cardinal.
Table 1 summarizes this simple taxonomy of di¤erent kinds of proposi-
tional attitudes.13
structure binary non-binary
role ordinal cardinal
belief (cognitive) judgments
ordinal
probabilities
subjective
probabilities
desire (emotive)
goals; categorical
preferences
ordinal
preferences
utilities
Table 1: Di¤erent kinds of propositional attitudes
For an agent to count as rational, the agents propositional attitudes are
usually required to satisfy certain conditions, which depend on the kinds of
attitudes in question. For example, in the case of binary beliefs (i.e., judg-
ments), full rationality requires truth-functional coherence. So judging that
p, q and p^q, which corresponds to a well-dened truth-value assignment, is
rational, while judging that p, q and :(p^q), which is incompatible with any
such assignment, is not. In the case of cardinal non-binary beliefs (i.e., sub-
jective probabilities), full rationality requires probabilistic coherence. For
instance, assigning probability 0:5 to p and 0:7 to p _ q is probabilistically
coherent and thus rational, while assigning probability 0:5 to p and 0:3 to
p _ q is not. Full rationality in the case of ordinal non-binary desires (i.e.,
preferences), to give a nal example, requires representability of those de-
sires by an ordering over the relevant propositions. Thus a preference for p
to q to r is rational (with p, q and r mutually exclusive), while a preference
for p to q, for q to r and for r to p, which violates transitivity, is not. These
13As noted, this draws on the taxonomy developed in List and Pettit (forthcoming).
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rationality conditions are just illustrative; we give more formal denitions
in subsequent sections. Any theory of rational agency will have to specify
not only what kinds of propositional attitudes are ascribed to an agent, but
also what the appropriate rationality conditions are.
We are now in a position to formulate the problem of attitude aggre-
gation: How can a combination called prole of propositional attitudes
across multiple individuals be aggregated into resulting collectiveproposi-
tional attitudes? In particular, how can this aggregation be performed in
such a way as to ensure the rationality of those collective attitudes? The
answer to this question depends crucially on the kinds of attitudes and ra-
tionality conditions in question, and on how complex the set of propositions
is over which the attitudes are held.
Notoriously, the aggregation of judgments or preferences runs into di¢ -
culties when rationality is understood as in our earlier examples and the at-
titudes are held over a set of propositions that is non-trivial in certain ways.
Arrows classic impossibility theorem, for instance, shows that when there
are three or more distinct objects of preference, only dictatorial aggregation
rules, where one xed individual always determines the collective attitudes,
can aggregate rational individual preferences into rational collective ones in
accordance with some minimal conditions.14 The recent impossibility theo-
rems on judgment aggregation establish similar results for the aggregation
of judgments.15
The picture is more positive in the case of cardinal non-binary attitudes,
whether belief-like or desire-like. There are some attractive aggregation
rules based on the idea of averaging, which allow the aggregation of rational
individual probability assignments into rational collective ones in accordance
with some plausible conditions, and similarly the aggregation of rational
individual utility assignments into rational collective ones. In the case of
probability assignments the belief case those aggregation rules are the
so-called linear pooling rules, as dened formally in the next section. In the
case of utility assignments the desire case they are the utilitarian rules
14See Arrow (1951/1963).
15Compare the earlier references.
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in the conventional sense.16
However, can we go beyond a case-by-case analysis of the aggregation of
particular kinds of propositional attitudes and say something more general
about the aggregation of propositional attitudes which applies to more than
one box within Table 1? Our aim in the next section is to provide a rst uni-
ed result about the aggregation of (i) subjective probabilities (i.e., cardinal
non-binary beliefs), (ii) judgments (i.e., binary beliefs), and (iii) preferences
(i.e., ordinal non-binary desires).
3 The rst theorem: linear and dictatorial rules
for probability, judgment and preference aggre-
gation
Let X be a set of propositions, represented in some logic or language L, on
which attitudes are to be aggregated from the individual to the collective
level.17 We assume that X is nite, closed under negation and contains at
least one contingent proposition.18 The precise content of X depends on the
16The latter require not only the cardinality of attitudes but also their interpersonal
comparability, but we set this issue aside in the present discussion.
17Formally, L is set of all propositions in the logic or language. Propositions in L can
be represented semantically or syntactically. In the semantic case, L consists of subsets
of some set 
 of possible worlds, where L is an algebra, i.e., (i) if p; q 2 L, then p\ q 2 L,
(ii) if p 2 L, then 
np 2 L, and (iii) ; 2 L. To capture logical interconnections, we dene
a subset Y of L to be inconsistent if \p2Y p = ;. In the syntactic case, L is the set of
sentences of some language which can express at least negation and conjunction, i.e., if
p; q 2 L, then :p; p ^ q 2 L. Logical interconnections in L are captured by a notion
of consistency satisfying some regularity conditions (Dietrich 2007a): any pair fp;:pg is
inconsistent; supersets of inconsistent sets are inconsistent; the empty set ; is consistent
and every consistent set of propositions S has a consistent superset T containing a member
of each pair p;:p in L; and any conjunction p^q is logically equivalent with the pair fp; qg.
A set of propositions S entails a proposition q if and only if S [ f:qg is inconsistent. We
use the syntactic notation here, writing p^q, :p, tautology, and contradictionrather
than p \ q, 
np, 
and ;, respectively. Other connectives are dened in the usual
way: e.g., p _ q stands for :(:p ^ :q), and p! q for :(p ^ :q).
18A proposition is contingent if it is neither a tautology nor a contradiction. Closure
under negation means that if some proposition p is in X, then so is its negation :p (more
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aggregation problem in question. In one context, an expert panel may need
to form a collective attitude on the proposition Annual CO2 emissions are
above 30000 million metric tons of carbonbut not on the proposition If CO2
emissions are above this threshold, then the Greenland ice shield will melt,
while in another context the panel may need to form collective attitudes
on both of these propositions as well as their implication The Greenland
ice shield will melt. In the latter case, the set X could be expressed as
containing propositions p, p ! q, q and their negations. It is perfectly
imaginable that individuals hold attitudes also on some propositions outside
the set X, but these attitudes are not taken into account in the aggregation.
For the purposes of our rst theorem, we assume further that the propo-
sitions in X exhibit some non-trivial logical interconnections. By this, we
mean that X has at least one minimal inconsistent subset of three or more
propositions, i.e., an inconsistent subset of that size all of whose proper
subsets are consistent. Practically any interesting set of propositions has
these properties. For instance, if the set X contains propositions p, p ! q,
q and their negations, as in the expert-panel example, then the assump-
tions are all met. In particular, the required minimal inconsistent subset is
fp; p! q;:qg.
We assume that there are n  2 individuals, labelled 1, 2, ..., n. Indi-
vidual is attitudes on the propositions in X are represented by an attitude
function, denoted Ai, which assigns to each proposition p in X a value Ai(p)
in a set of possible values V . For the moment, we focus on two kinds of atti-
tudes: subjective probabilities (cardinal non-binary beliefs) and judgments
(binary beliefs). Below we also consider preferences (ordinal non-binary de-
sires), which we will model di¤erently. In the case of subjective probabilities,
the value set V is the interval [0; 1], and an attitude function is rational if
it is probabilistically coherent, i.e., extendable to a well-dened probability
function on the entire logic or language.19 In the case of judgments, the
precisely, a proposition logically equivalent to :p, so as to prevent X from having to
contain all of :p;::p;:::p etc.). The set X is often called the agenda, and our non-
triviality condition is an example of an agenda condition (often called non-simplicity).
19Formally, Ai is rational if there exists a function Pr : L ! R such that, for every
proposition p in X, Pr(p) = Ai(p), and Pr satises the axioms of probability theory, i.e.,
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value set V is the set f0; 1g, and an attitude function is rational if it is
truth-functionally coherent, i.e., extendable to a well-dened truth-function
on the entire logic or language. Note that truth-functions are special cases
of probability functions restricted to the extremal values 0 and 1.
As already said, an n-tuple of attitude functions across individuals is
called a prole. We are looking for an aggregation rule, denoted F , which
assigns to each admissible prole (A1; A2; :::; An) a collective attitude func-
tion A = F (A1; A2; :::; An). Let us introduce four conditions that such an
aggregation rule might be expected to satisfy:
Universal domain. F accepts as admissible inputs all possible proles of
rational individual attitude functions.
Collective rationality. F generates as its outputs rational collective atti-
tude functions.
Independence. F generates the collective attitude on each proposition p
in the set X as a function of individual attitudes on p.
To state the nal condition, we say that an attitude function is compatible
with the implication p ! q if the attitude function can be extended to a
probability or truth-function such that the value 1 is assigned to p! q.
Implication preservation. For all propositions p and q in the setX and all
admissible proles, if all individualsattitude functions are compatible with
the implication p ! q, then so is the collective attitude function generated
by F .
While the requirements of universal domain and collective rationality are
intuitively plausible, the main defence of independence is the democratic idea
that the collective attitude on each proposition should be determined by the
individualsattitudes on it. This reects a local notion of democratic aggre-
gation, which underlies, for example, majority voting and other systems of
(i) Pr(p)  0 for every p 2 L; (ii) Pr(p) = 1 for every tautology p 2 L; and (iii) Pr(p_ q)
= Pr(p) + Pr(q) whenever p and q are mutually inconsistent.
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direct democracy. Under a more holistic notion, by contrast, the collective
attitude on a proposition p might also be inuenced by individual attitudes
on other propositions deemed relevant to p, e.g., on premisesor reasons
for p.20 In many contexts, independence also turns out to be necessary for
avoiding various forms of manipulability of an aggregation rule.21
The idea underlying implication-preservation is also intuitive: if all in-
dividualsattitudes are compatible with some conditional proposition, for
example that increased CO2 emissions lead to a temperature increase, then
the collective attitudes should not be incompatible with it. Since the con-
ditional p! q need not be among the propositions in X (even when p and
q are in X), the statement of implication preservation is formulated not
in terms of the assignment of an attitude of 1 to p ! q, but in terms of
compatibility with this assignment.
Obviously, the precise meaning of the conditions particularly univer-
sal domain and collective rationality depends on whether the value set of
the attitude functions is the interval [0; 1] or just the set f0; 1g. In either
case, however, the four conditions characterize a very particular class of ag-
gregation rules. To state a general result, which applies to both subjective
probabilities and judgments, call an aggregation rule linear if there exist
non-negative weights w1; w2; :::; wn summing to 1 such that, for every prole
(A1; A2; :::; An) of rational individual attitude functions and every proposi-
tion p in the set X, the collective attitude on p is the weighted average of
the individual attitudes on it, i.e.,
A(p) = w1A1(p) + w2A2(p) + :::+ wnAn(p):
Theorem 1. An aggregation rule satises universal domain, collective ratio-
nality, independence and implication preservation if and only if it is linear.
This theorem has radically di¤erent implications in the non-binary and
binary cases. In the non-binary case of subjective probabilities, it is easy
20On holistic aggregation, see, e.g., List and Pettit (2006), Dietrich (2007b).
21On agendaand strategicmanipulability, see Dietrich (2006) and Dietrich and List
(2007c), respectively.
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to see that every combination of weights w1; w2; :::; wn gives rise to a lin-
ear aggregation rule, which satises the theorems conditions. The weighted
average of several coherent probability assignments is still a coherent prob-
ability assignment.
Implication 1. The probability aggregation rules satisfying the four con-
ditions are precisely the linear rules dened for all possible combinations
of weights. In particular, any combination of weights w1; w2; :::; wn denes
such a rule.22
In the binary case of judgments, by contrast, it is no longer true that
every combination of weights w1; w2; :::; wn gives rise to a well-dened linear
aggregation rule. In particular, unless all weight is assigned to a single
individual, the average of the individual attitudes is not generally restricted
to the extremal values 0 and 1, even in the presence of this restriction at the
individual level. In other words, the well-dened linear rules in the binary
case are all of a special form: they are dictatorial, i.e., one individual i has
weight 1 while all others have weight 0.
Implication 2. The judgment aggregation rules satisfying the four condi-
tions are precisely the dictatorial rules, which are the only well-dened linear
rules in this case.
Theorem 1 and implications 1 and 2 are of particular interest in relation
to the recent literatures on probabilistic opinion pooling and judgment ag-
gregation, respectively. Linear rules have gained particular prominence in
recent debates on how to reconcile disagreements between epistemic peers.23
The main rules proposed in this context, namely splitting the di¤erence,
sticking to ones own opinion (applicable only under the individual delib-
eration interpretation of attitude aggregation) and deferring to another in-
dividuals opinion, are all instances of linear rules. On the other hand, the
recent literature on judgment aggregation is replete with characterizations of
22This implication generalizes a classic result by McConway (1981); see also Lehrer and
Wagner (1981). For a more technical account, see Dietrich and List (2007b).
23E.g., Elga (2007). Earlier contributions include Lehrer and Wagner (1981).
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dictatorial rules.24 It is therefore illuminating to see that both linear prob-
ability aggregation rules and dictatorial judgment aggregation rules can be
characterized using the same conditions.
Can we extend this unied characterization further? In particular, does
theorem 1 have any implication for the aggregation of preferences as well?
Our route towards such an implication is less direct than our routes in the
previous cases. While it is also possible to represent preferences by attitude
functions, which are unique only up to positive monotonic transformations,
a more elegant representation employs binary relations. Suppose that an
agent holds preferences on some set of objects K. Since the focus of the
present paper is on propositional attitudes, we assume that the objects of
preferences are also propositions, but the set K could in principle be any set
of objects: candidates, policy options, states of a¤airs etc. We assume that
K has at least three, but nitely many, elements. We represent an agents
preferences on K for simplicity, we assume they are strict by a binary
relation  on K, where p  q is interpreted to mean that the agent prefers p
to q. The preference relation  is rational just in case it satises the axioms
of strict preferences.25
Let us now construct a special set of propositions X consisting of all
binary ranking propositions of the form p  q, where p and q are distinct
elements of K. We call a set of binary ranking propositions consistent if
it respects the axioms of strict preferences. For example, the set fp  q,
q  rg (where p, q and r are distinct elements of K) is consistent, while the
set fp  q, q  r, r  pg is not. A preference relation  on K can then
be reexpressed as a binary attitude function A on X, where A(p  q) = 1
if p  q, and A(p  q) = 0 otherwise. The preference relation  is rational
if and only if the attitude function A is truth-functionally coherent relative
to the axioms on strict preferences.
To apply theorem 1, we begin by observing that, since K has three or
more elements, the set X we have constructed has a minimal inconsistent
24See the earlier references.
25For all p, q, r in K, (i) if p  q then not q  p (asymmetry), (ii) if p  q and q  r,
then p  r (transitivity), and (iii) if p 6= q, then either p  q or q  p (connectedness).
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subset of three or more propositions and thereby meets the assumption re-
quired for the application of theorem 1. For instance, if p, q and r are three
distinct elements of K, then a minimal inconsistent subset of X of size 3 is
the set fp  q, q  r, r  pg. Moreover, the four conditions of theorem
1 can be restated as conditions on preference aggregation rules. Universal
domain and collective rationality correspond to the equally named condi-
tions in Arrows classic theorem on preference aggregation. Independence
corresponds to the independence of irrelevant alternatives, whereby the col-
lective preference over any pair of propositions p and q in K depends only
on individual preferences over this pair. Implication preservation, nally,
strengthens the Pareto principle, according to which any unanimous indi-
vidual preference for p over q should be preserved collectively.26 We obtain
the following result as an immediate implication of theorem 1, via implica-
tion 2:
Implication 3. The preference aggregation rules satisfying the four condi-
tions are precisely the dictatorial rules.
Setting aside the strengthening of the Pareto principle, this result lies in
the close vicinity of Arrows theorem.27 Theorem 1 thus provides a unied
result by which we can characterize not only linear probability aggregation
and dictatorial judgment aggregation, but also Arrovian dictatorial prefer-
ence aggregation using the same conditions.
Before generalizing this picture further, it is worth noting that our initial
assumption for the applicability of theorem 1 namely thatX has a minimal
inconsistent subset of three or more propositions is logically tight: it is not
only su¢ cient for the theorem but also necessary.28 Whenever X violates
this assumption i.e., all its minimal inconsistent subsets are of size at most
26To see why the Pareto principle follows from implication preservation, note that a
preference for p over q is equivalent to an attitude of 1 on p  q, and hence to a value
of 1 given to the implication :(p  q) ! (p  q)by any truth-function extending the
attitude function.
27For an exact match of Arrows theorem, see Dietrich and List (2007a).
28Assuming n  3.
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two there do exist aggregation rules that satisfy all of the theorems con-
ditions and yet are not linear or dictatorial. In the probabilistic case, those
rules are somewhat complicated to construct, but in the case of judgment
and preference aggregation, they include majority rule.29 Thus our theorem
o¤ers a dual characterization: rst, it characterizes the class of aggregation
rules satisfying the theorems conditions; and secondly, it characterizes the
sets of propositions X for which this characterization of aggregation rules
holds.
4 The second theorem: systematic rules more gen-
erally
In the previous section, we have o¤ered a rst unied result on three seem-
ingly disparate aggregation problems: probability aggregation, judgment
aggregation and preference aggregation. Can we obtain an even more gen-
eral result, which abstracts further from the specic kinds of attitudes in
question? In this section, we present a rst result which applies to a very
general class of belief-like attitudes, including not only judgments and sub-
jective probabilities, but also non-binary truth-value assignments, fuzzy and
vague truth-value assignments and ranking functions.
As before, X is the set of propositions on which attitudes are to be
held, and an attitude function Ai assigns to each proposition p in X a value
Ai(p) in some set of possible values V . Again, the rationality conditions
on attitude functions depend on the kinds of attitudes in question. While
in the previous section we dened the rationality of an attitude function
in terms of its extendability to a probability or truth-function, depending
on whether the attitudes are subjective probabilities or judgments, we now
dene rationality more abstractly in terms of extendability to a so-called
valuation function. This is a function, denoted f , which assigns to each
29For an explicit construction in the probabilistic case, see Dietrich and List (2007b).
In the binary case, majority voting has the required properties when n is odd, i.e., there
cannot be majority ties. For general group size, one can use majority voting among any
non-singleton subgroup with odd size.
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proposition p in the logic or language L a value f(p) in the value set V ,
subject to some relevant constraints. The precise constraints can take a
number of di¤erent forms the constraints on probability or truth-functions
being special cases. But minimally, it must be possible to arrange the values
within V in some complete or partial order of strength, denoted  and
bounded below by some minimal element vmin, such that the admissible
valuation functions respect that order of strength:30
(i) For any admissible valuation function f and any propositions p and
q in L, if p logically entails q, the value of q must be at least as great
as that of p, i.e., f(q)  f(p).
(ii) For any admissible valuation function f and any propositions p and q
in L, if q has the minimal value, i.e., f(q) = vmin, the disjunction p_q
has the same value as p, i.e., f(p _ q) = f(p).
(iii) For any value v in V , any non-tautological proposition p in L and any
proposition q in L that entails p but is not equivalent to p, there exists
an admissible valuation function f such that f(p) = v and f(q) = vmin.
In the familiar cases of probability theory and classical logic, the value
sets are the interval [0; 1] and the set f0; 1g, respectively; the ordering on
V is the usual order on the numbers, with minimal element vmin = 0, i.e.,
zero probability or falsehood; and the admissible valuation functions are the
probability functions and truth-functions, respectively.31 Below we discuss
further examples.
In this general framework, as already indicated, an attitude function
Ai is rational if it is extendable to an admissible valuation function. It is
30A partial ordering  on V is a reexive, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relation.
A minimal element with respect to  is an element vmin 2 V such that, for all v 2 V ,
v  vmin.
31Probability and truth-functions satisfy property (i) because the probability or truth-
value of propositions decreases (weakly) in their logical strength. They satisfy (ii) because
the probability or truth-value of a proposition does not change by adding a disjunct that
has zero probability or is false. They satisfy (iii) because there are enough degrees of
freedom in how probabilities or truth-values can be assigned.
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easy to see that this denition reduces to the special cases of probabilistic
coherence or truth-functional coherence when the admissible valuation func-
tions are precisely the probability functions or truth-functions. As before,
we are looking for an aggregation rule F which assigns to each admissible
prole (A1; A2; :::; An) a collective attitude function A = F (A1; A2; :::; An).
In particular, we impose the following conditions on such a function:
Universal domain. As before.
Collective rationality. As before.
Independence. As before.
Consensus preservation. If all individuals submit the same attitude func-
tion to the aggregation rule, then this attitude function is also the collec-
tive one, i.e., F (A;A; :::; A) = A for every admissible unanimous prole
(A;A; :::; A).
The following result holds. Call an aggregation rule systematic if there
exists some propositionwise decision criterion d which maps each n-tuple
of values v1; v2; :::; vn in V to a single value v = d(v1; v2; :::; vn) such that,
for every prole (A1; A2; :::; An) of rational individual attitude functions and
every proposition p in the set X, the collective attitude on p is determined
by applying the decision criterion d to the individual attitudes on p, i.e.,
A(p) = d(A1(p); A2(p); :::; An(p)).
Examples of propositionwise decision criteria are various possible averaging
criteria as in the case of linear rules.
Theorem 2. Assuming the propositions in the set X exhibit su¢ ciently rich
logical interconnections, every aggregation rule satisfying universal domain,
collective rationality, independence and consensus preservation is system-
atic.32
32This theorem generalizes earlier results in the binary cases of abstract aggregation
(Nehring and Puppe 2002, Dokow and Holzman forthcoming) and judgment aggregation
(Dietrich and List 2007a).
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What do we mean by su¢ ciently rich logical interconnections? It is not
enough for the theorem to require, as in the earlier results, that X has
a minimal inconsistent subset of three or more propositions. Instead, we
require, more strongly, that the propositions in X are path-connected : for
any pair of propositions p and q in X, it is possible to reachq from p via a
sequence of pairwise conditional entailments.33 Examples of path-connected
sets are the set containing propositions p, q, p ^ q, p _ q and negations as
well as the set of binary ranking propositions over three or more objects as
dened in the previous section. Moreover, any subset of the logic or language
L that is closed under conjunction or disjunction is path-connected.34
Theorem 2 basically tells us that, in the general case, any aggregation
function satisfying the theorems four conditions is denable in terms of a
single propositionwise decision criterion.35 Linear or dictatorial rules, as
discussed in the previous section, are of course special cases of such rules.
How general is the present theorem? As we have already noted, prob-
ability functions and truth-functions are instances of valuation functions,
and thus the theorem covers the cases of probability and judgment aggre-
gation. Other important examples of valuation functions are non-binary
truth-functions, fuzzy or vague truth-functions, and ranking functions. Non-
binary truth-functions take values in the set V = f0; 1; :::; T   1g, where T
is the number of possible truth-values, and are dened as in T -valued logic.
Fuzzy or vague truth-functions take values in the interval V = [0; 1] and
are dened as in fuzzy logic or a suitable semantics for vagueness.36 Rank-
33Formally, there exists a sequence of propositions p1; p2; :::; pk 2 X with p1 = p and
pk = q such that, for each j, pj [ Y logically entails pj+1, where Y is some subset of X
consistent with each of pj and :pj+1. This condition was rst introduced in an abstract
aggregation setting by Nehring and Puppe (2002) under the name total blockedness.
34Assuming that the subset contains more than two propositions and that tautologies
and contradictions are removed from it.
35 In the special case of probabilities or judgments, the theorems path-connectedness
assumption on X is not only su¢ cient for the result but also necessary, i.e., in its absence,
there exist non-systematic rules satisfying the theorems conditions. In the binary case,
see also Nehring and Puppe (2002).
36 If L is a propositional logic or language with : and ^ as its only connectives, a T -
valued truth-function is usually dened as a function f : L ! f0; 1; :::; T   1g satisfying
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ing functions, as dened by Spohn (forthcoming), take values in the set
V = f0; 1; :::g [ f1g of non-negative integers together with innity. The
rank of a proposition p can be interpreted as a degree of rejectability or
disbelief, and the order  is thus dened as the reverse of the natural order,
leading to the minimal value vmin = 1.37 To give an example in which
the order  is incomplete, let the set of values V have four elements: vmin
(rejectable), vmax (acceptable), u (undecidable out of conicting infor-
mation) and u0 (undecidable out of conicting intuition). Let  be the
partial order on V that ranks vmin below all other values and vmax above all
other values while leaving u and u0 unranked relative to each other. Let a
valuation function be simply any function from L to V = fvmin; vmax; u; u0g
satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above. For instance, the proposition it
will rainmay be deemed undecidable out of conicting information (u), the
proposition a party in the rain is funmay be deemed undecidable out of
conicting intuition (u0), the conjunction it will rain and a party in the rain
is funmay be deemed rejectable (vmin) and the corresponding disjunction
acceptable (vmax).38
In each of these cases, our theorem implies that, when the rationality
f(p^p) = minff(p); f(q)g and f(:p) = T  f(p), and a fuzzy truth-function as a function
f : L! [0; 1] satisfying f(p ^ p) = minff(p); f(q)g and f(:p) = 1  f(p). In both cases,
the order  on V is the usual one.
37A ranking function gives tautologies maximal rank 0, contradictions rank 1, and
disjunctions p_ q the minimum of the ranks of p and q (with minimumunderstood here
in terms of the natural order). Ranking functions are particularly useful in belief revision
theory, since it is possible to dene conditional ranks as well as unconditional ones.
38Some notable exceptions of functions violating our conditions for valuation func-
tions above are capacity functions and Dempster-Schafer belief and plausibility functions
(Dempster 1967; Schafer 1976). Such functions are vaguely described as being non-additive
variants of probability functions. More precisely, they resemble probability functions in
that they take values in the interval [0; 1], assign a value of 0 to contradictions and a value
of 1 to tautologies, and are monotonic (i.e., they satisfy (i)), but crucially the value of
disjunctions p _ q of mutually exclusive disjuncts may di¤er from the sum of values of p
and q. For instance, someone may assign value 0 to the proposition that it will rain on
Monday and also to the proposition that it will rain on Tuesday, but a positive value to
the proposition that it will rain on either Monday or Tuesday. This may cause a violation
of our condition (ii) on valuation functions.
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of propositional attitudes is dened in terms of extendability to a valuation
function with the specied properties, the only aggregation rules satisfying
universal domain, collective rationality, independence and consensus preser-
vation (for a set of propositions X with su¢ ciently rich interconnections)
are the systematic rules.
5 Concluding remarks
After presenting a taxonomy of di¤erent kinds of propositional attitudes 
in terms of their role and structure we have formulated the problem of
propositional attitude aggregation as follows. There is a set of propositions
on which attitudes are to be held, represented in some suitable logic or
language. An agents attitudes are usually represented by an attitude func-
tion, which assigns to each proposition in that set a particular value from
some set of possible values. The value assigned to a proposition could be
its truth-value, probability value or some other measure of its acceptabil-
ity or rejectability. An agents attitudes are deemed rational if the attitude
function representing them is extendable to a well-dened valuation function
on the entire logic or language. Important special cases of such valuation
functions are truth-functions and probability functions. An aggregation rule,
nally, maps each admissible combination of individual attitude functions to
a resulting collective attitude function. Aggregation rules can be axiomati-
cally characterized in terms of certain conditions; we have here considered
only a few examples of such conditions, namely universal domain, collective
rationality, independence, and implication or consensus preservation.
To illustrate our approach, we have proved two new theorems. The
rst theorem simultaneously characterizes linear and dictatorial aggrega-
tion rules in the important cases of probability, judgment and preference
aggregation and thus o¤ers a rst step towards integrating the literatures
on probabilistic opinion pooling, judgment aggregation and Arrovian pref-
erence aggregation. It is illuminating to see that such seemingly disparate
things as splitting-the-di¤erence in probabilistic opinion pooling and dicta-
torships in preference aggregation can be axiomatically characterized using
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the same conditions. The second theorem abstracts even further from the
specic kinds of attitudes in question and describes a large class of aggrega-
tion rules the systematic rules applicable to a wide variety of belief-like
attitudes.
Of course, one may wish to generalize these results further, by studying
an even broader variety of propositional attitudes and considering aggre-
gation rules other than systematic, linear or dictatorial ones. The present
results, however, are only meant to be illustrative of our more general ap-
proach. We hope that this paper will not only establish the ingredients of a
general theory of propositional attitude aggregation, but also open up new
avenues for further research.
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A Appendix: Proofs
The notation is as introduced above. The proofs presented here are formu-
lated for the case that propositions are represented syntactically, but the
proofs in the semantic case are very similar (and, if anything, simpler; for
example, Lemma 1 becomes unnecessary).
Theorem 1 is derived from two earlier results of ours.
Proof of theorem 1. (1) First, consider a linear rule. Obviously, the
rule satises independence and universal domain. In the binary case, we
have already explained that linear rules are dictatorial, which implies that
implication preservation and collective rationality are satised as well. In the
probabilistic case, collective rationality and implication preservation follow
from the fact that a weighted average of probability functions on L is again
a probability function.
(2) Conversely, suppose a rule F satises all four conditions. In the
case of binary attitudes, these conditions become equivalent to those in an
earlier impossibility theorem;39 and by this theorem F is dictatorial; so F is
linear (with all weight assigned to the dictator). In the case of probabilistic
attitudes, our four conditions become equivalent to conditions of another
39Dietrich and List (2008).
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earlier theorem after some translation work,40 and by this theorem F is
linear. 
Our proof of theorem 2 is self-contained and builds on the following
lemmas.
Lemma 1 Every valuation function f : L! V satises f(p) = f(q) for all
logically equivalent p; q in L.
Proof. Let f be a valuation function and let p; q in L be logically equiva-
lent. As q entails p and p entails q, and by property (i) of valuation functions,
f(p)  f(q) and f(q)  f(p); so, by anti-symmetry of , f(p) = f(q). 
Lemma 2 For every valuation function f and all p1; :::; pk in L (k  1) if
f(p1) = ::: = f(pk) = vmin then f(p1 _ ::: _ pk) = vmin.
Proof. Let f be a valuation function. The proof is by induction on k. For
k = 1 the claim is obvious. Now suppose the claim holds for k, and consider
p1; ::::; pk+1 in L such that f(p1) = ::: = f(pk+1) = vmin. By induction
hypothesis, f(p1 _ ::: _ pk) = vmin, and hence by one of our assumptions on
valuation functions
f(p1 _ ::: _ pk+1) = f((p1 _ ::: _ pk) _ pk+1) = f(pk+1) = vmin. 
Lemma 3 Let an aggregation rule F satisfy universal domain, indepen-
dence and unanimity preservation. For all p in X, all v in V , and all pro-
les (A1; :::; An) of rational attitude functions, if A1(p) = ::: = An(p) = v
then F (A1; :::; An)(p) = v.
Proof. Let F be as specied, consider any p in X and any (A1; :::; An) in
the universal domain, and assume that A1(p) = ::: = An(p). The (universal)
40The result is the second theorem in Dietrich and List (2007b). An expositional di¤er-
ence is that in Dietrich and List (2007b) we aggregate probability measures dened not
on X but on a full algebra that corresponds to the present set L. In turn, the conditions
we use there (independence etc.) quantify only over the members of X. The linearity
conclusion obtained there carries over to the present framework, as can be veried.
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domain of F also contains the unanimous prole (A1; :::; A1). Applying
independence and then unanimity preservation, we have F (A1; :::; An)(p) =
F (A1; :::; A1)(p) = A1(p). 
Lemma 4 Let an aggregation rule F satisfy universal domain, collective
rationality, independence and unanimity preservation. For all p; q in X, if
p conditionally entails q, then Dp  Dq, where Dp; Dq : V n ! V are (by
independence, existent) local decision rules for p and q, respectively.
Proof. Let F be as specied, and let p in X conditionally entail q in X;
say in virtue of Y  X. Let (v1; :::; vn) in V n. We show that Dp(v1; :::; vn) 
Dq(v1; :::; vn).
Check that q_(:^y2Y y) is not a tautology and that [:p^q^(^y2Y y)]_
[: ^y2Y y] entails it without being equivalent to it. So, by property (iii) of
valuation functions, there are valuation functions f1; :::; fn such that, for all
i,
fi(q _ (: ^y2Y y)) = vi and fi([:p ^ q ^ (^y2Y y)] _ [: ^y2Y y]) = vmin.
Consider any individual i. By property (i) of valuation functions, it follows
that
fi(:p ^ q ^ (^y2Y y))  vmin,
fi(r ^ [: ^y2Y y])  fi(: ^y2Y y)  vmin for all r in L,
fi(y)  vmin for all y in Y ,
and hence, as vmin is minimal,
fi(:p ^ q ^ (^y2Y y)) = vmin,
fi(r ^ [: ^y2Y y]) = fi(: ^y2Y y) = vmin for all r in L,
fi(:y) = vmin for all y in Y .
The rst two of these three equation lines imply (using Lemma 1 and one
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of our assumptions on valuation functions) that
fi(p) = fi([p ^ (^y2Y y)] _ [p ^ (: ^y2Y y)])
= fi(p ^ (^y2Y y)) = vi,
fi(q) = fi([p ^ (^y2Y y))] _ [:p ^ q ^ (^y2Y y))] _ [q ^ : ^y2Y y])
= fi([p ^ (^y2Y y))] _ [:p ^ q ^ (^y2Y y))])
= fi(p ^ (^y2Y y))) = vi.
Dene Ai : X ! V as fijX , the restriction of fi to X. By universal domain,
the prole (A1; :::; An) is in the domain of F . As we have just shown,
Ai(p) = Ai(q) = vi for all individuals i = 1; :::; n.
So, letting A denote the output attitude function F (A1; :::; An) and f : L!
V a (by collective rationality existent) extension of A to a valuation function,
we have
f(p) = Dp(v1; :::; vn) and f(q) = Dq(v1; :::; vn).
Further, for each y in Y we have shown that Ai(:y) = vmin for all i, so that
by Lemma 3 A(:y) = vmin, i.e., f(:y) = vmin. So f(_y2Y :y) = vmin by
Lemma 2, i.e., f(: ^y2Y y) = vmin by Lemma 1. Hence, by property (i)
of valuation functions, f(r ^ (: ^y2Y y)) = vmin for all r in L. So, using
another one of our assumptions on valuation functions and then Lemma 1,
f(r ^ (^y2Y y)) = f([r ^ (^y2Y y)] _ [r ^ (: ^y2Y y)]) = f(r) for all r in L.
In particular,
f(p ^ (^y2Y y)) = f(p) and f(q ^ (^y2Y y)) = f(q).
So, by property (i) of valuation functions and as p ^ (^y2Y y) entails q ^
(^y2Y y), we have f(p)  f(q), i.e., Dp(v1; :::; vn)  Dq(v1; :::; vn). 
Proof of Theorem 2. Let the aggregation rule satisfy all four conditions.
The last lemma tells us that, for all p; q inX, we haveDp  Dq andDq  Dp,
and hence Dp = Dq as  is anti-symmetric. 
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